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We present a novel phase-based encoding scheme for measurement-device-independent quantum
key distribution (MDI-QKD). This protocol uses single photons in a linear superposition of three
orthogonal states, for generating the key. These orthogonal states correspond to the three distinct
paths in delay line interferometers used by two (trusted) sources. The key information is decoded by
an untrusted third party Charles, who uses a beamsplitter to measure the phase difference between
pulses traveling through different paths of the two delay lines. The proposed scheme combines
the best of both differential-phase-shift (DPS) QKD and MDI-QKD. It is more robust to phase
fluctuations, and also ensures protection against detector side-channel attacks. We obtain the secure
key rate for our protocol and show that it compares well to existing protocols in the asymptotic
regime. We also prove unconditionally security by demonstrating an equivalent protocol involving
shared entanglement between the two trusted parties. Finally, we bridge the gap between theory
and practice by quantifying the performance of the proposed protocol in the finite-key regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is proven to be un-
conditionally secure in theory [1–5]. However, QKD pro-
tocols maybe rendered insecure in practice, because of
the difference in the behavior of practical devices and
their theoretical models used in security proofs. For ex-
ample, the standard protocols and their security proofs
fail to take into account side-channel attacks on the de-
tectors [6–14], thereby compromising security.
Various solutions have been proposed to counteract
side-channel attacks. One solution is to develop precise
mathematical models of devices used in the QKD exper-
iments and incorporate these models into new security
proofs [15, 16]. However, the complex nature of devices
makes this approach very challenging to realize in prac-
tice. The other solution is to develop counter measures
against the known side-channel attacks [17, 18], but the
QKD system still remains vulnerable to unanticipated at-
tacks. Device independent QKD (DI-QKD)[19, 20] is an-
other viable candidate against side-channel attacks. The
security of DI-QKD relies on the violations of Bell in-
equality. However, the requirement of loophole-free Bell
test and an extremely low key rate at long distances
makes this unfeasible with current technology [21, 22].
Measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [23]
was introduced as a practical solution to side-channel at-
tacks on the measurement unit.
In an MDI-QKD protocol, Alice and Bob encode their
respective classical key bits into quantum states and send
it to a potentially untrusted party, Charles. It is assumed
that the measurement unit is under complete control of
Charles, who carries out the measurement and announces
the results. This is followed by the usual steps of sifting,
error correction and privacy amplification as carried out
in standard QKD protocols. The first MDI-QKD scheme
was designed for a polarization-based implementation of
BB84 [23]. MDI protocols employing time-bin [24, 25]
and phase-based encodings [26–29] also exist in the lit-
erature – see [30] for a recent review. However, ran-
dom phase and polarization fluctuations are a major hin-
drance in long distance implementations of polarization
and phase-based MDI-QKD schemes.
Here, we propose a differential-phase-shift MDI-QKD
(DPS MDI-QKD) scheme, as a potential candidate for al-
leviating random phase and polarization fluctuations. In
a differential phase encoded QKD protocol, the classical
key is encoded in the phase difference between successive
pulses generated by a source thereby canceling the effects
of phase and polarization fluctuations. There are a few
variants of differential-phase-shift keying proposed in the
literature [31]. For example, the sender Alice could use a
phase modulator in combination with a random number
generator to apply a random phase of either 0 or pi, on a
sequence of successive pulses generated by a weak coher-
ent source [32]. Alternately, the phase modulation maybe
done on a single photon pulse converted into a superpo-
sition of three orthogonal states corresponding to three
different time-bins, via a delay line interferometer [33].
Here, we make use of the 3-pulse protocol, whose secu-
rity is based on the fact that the eavesdropper has to dis-
tinguish between a set of four non-orthogonal quantum
states. While the coherent-state DPS protocol is prov-
ably secure against individual attacks [34], the single-
photon based 3-pulse protocol is shown to be uncondi-
tionally secure [35]. However, this security proof assumes
infinitely long keys whereas experimental implementa-
tions are constrained by the finite computational power
of Alice and Bob, resulting in keys of finite length.
Finite-key analysis of QKD protocols has attracted a
lot of attention in the past decade. Effect of the finiteness
of the key size on security parameters was first studied
in [36]. Security of BB84 [37] and decoy state protocols
[38–40] against collective attacks in the finite-key regime
has been established. Techniques used for finite-key anal-
ysis of conventional QKD have also been applied to MDI-
QKD, for specific attacks [41]. More recently, a rigorous
security proof of MDI-QKD against general attacks for a
finite key length has been demonstrated [42].
In this paper, we present a measurement-device-
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2independent QKD scheme which incorporates the advan-
tages of differential phase encoding. We show that our
scheme offers better security in the asymptotic regime,
and present a security proof in the finite-key regime as
well. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II we briefly review the 3-pulse DPS-QKD proto-
col and its security aspects. We discuss our DPS-MDI
protocol in Sec. III and obtain the secure key rate. We
show that it maps to an entanglement-based protocol in
Sec. IV A and finally present the finite-key analysis in
Sec. IV.
FIG. 1: Schematic of 3-pulse differential-phase-shift QKD.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Starting with the original proposal to implement
the well known B92 protocol [43], differential-phase or
distributed-phase protocols have been well studied in the
QKD literature [31]. Such protocols are popular be-
cause they are relatively easy to implement (compared
to polarization-based protocols) and are more robust to
phase and polarization fluctuations. While the majority
of the phase-based schemes use weak coherent pulses for
encoding the key, here we use the single-photon scheme
proposed in [33]. We shall henceforth refer to this scheme
as the 3-pulse DPS-QKD protocol and provide a brief de-
scription below.
A. 3-pulse differential-phase-shift keying
In a 3-pulse DPS-QKD protocol, the sender (Alice)
throws a single photon into a superposition of three time-
bins, corresponding to the three distinct paths of a delay
line interferometer, and then uses a phase modulator to
introduce a relative phase between successive pulses in
the 3-pulse train. See Fig. 1 for a schematic of the full
set-up. Alice encodes her random key bit {0, 1} as a ran-
dom phase {0, pi} between successive pulses. The receiver
(Bob) thus gets one of the four non-orthogonal quantum
states given below, corresponding to the four possible
phase-differences.
|ψ(±,±)〉 =
1√
3
( |1〉1|0〉2|0〉3 ± |0〉1|1〉2|0〉3 ± |0〉1|0〉2|1〉3 ) . (1)
Here, |1〉 and |0〉 indicate the presence and absence of a
photon respectively, in each of the paths labeled 1, 2, 3 in
Fig. 1. The photon has an equal probability of traversing
each of the paths.
Bob’s decoding setup comprises of an unbalanced
Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI) and two single-
photon detectors. The path lengths are chosen such that
the longer arm of Bob’s MZI introduces a time delay ∆t
which is exactly equal to the time taken by the photon in
traversing the difference in the lengths of the two succes-
sive arms of Alice’s delay line interferometer. Thus, Bob
can detect the incoming photon in one of the four possi-
ble time-instances, which we label as t1, t2, t3, t4, which
are separated by a time of ∆t. Detections at times t1
and t4 do not provide any phase information, whereas
detections at times t2 and t3 provide information about
the relative phases θ12 and θ23 respectively (see Fig. 1).
Specifically, Bob decodes the key bit associated with a
given time-slot as a 0 (1) if detector D0 (D1) clicks. By
publicly announcing his detection times, Bob performs
key-reconciliation with Alice and it is easy to see that
the sifted key rate for this 3-pulse protocol is 1/2.
An alternate form of phase-encoded QKD is the pulse-
train DPS-QKD [32], which is a variant of the original
B92 protocol [43]. In the pulse-train protocol, Alice gen-
erates a train of coherent pulses and applies a phase of 0
or pi to the pulses randomly, to encode key bits {0, 1}
respectively. These phase modulated pulse trains are
sent to Bob, who passes the incoming pulses through
3an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI). De-
pending upon the phase difference between two successive
pulses, constructive or destructive interference happens.
A measurement-device-independent QKD protocol based
on the coherent-state pulse-train DPS protocol has been
proposed recently [27].
We refer to [44] for a detailed analysis of the secure key
rate for the 3-pulse DPS protocol, assuming individual
attacks. A simple comparison with the pulse-train DPS
protocol [45] shows that the 3-pulse variant offers better
security against individual attacks, in the following sense:
the error rate introduced by an eavesdropper is typically
higher, whereas the learning rate of the eavesdropper is
typically lower for the 3-pulse protocol [44].
Finally, we note that the 3-pulse DPS-QKD proto-
col can be extended to an n-pulse protocol by increas-
ing the number of possible paths that the single photon
can take at the sender’s set-up. In fact, the single pho-
ton DPS protocol using n such paths has been shown
to be unconditionally secure against general attacks for
any n ≥ 3 [35]. However, while a larger n achieves a
higher sifted key rate per emitted photon, it also results
in a lower key rate per pulse; in fact, the n = 3 proto-
col is shown to achieve the optimal secure key rate per
pulse [35].
III. DPS-MDI-QKD
We now describe our measurement-device-independent
QKD protocol based on the 3-pulse phase encoding
scheme, using ideal single-photon sources. Apart from
the fact that this scheme offers better security against in-
dividual attacks, compared to other DPS protocols, there
are other practical considerations that motivate our use
of the 3-path superposition in our protocol.
Firstly, the phase-independent nature of Hong-Ou-
Mandel interference [46] makes it difficult to design a
pulse-train protocol for ideal single-photon sources. An
MDI protocol based on a two-pulse superposition has
been studied in the literature [28]. However, this would
require four different phase values for encoding the in-
formation, resulting in a phase-encoded version of BB84.
Using only two phase values (0 and pi) makes the states in
a two-pulse protocol orthogonal, making them perfectly
distinguishable [35]. Hence, we need at least 3-paths in
the superposition to implement an MDI protocol using
only a pair of phases 0 and pi for the encoding.
A simple schematic is shown in Fig. 2. Alice and Bob
generate single-photon pulses which are passed through
their respective delay line interferometers. The split-
ting ratios of the beamsplitters (BSM) of the delay lines
are selected such that every photon has an equal prob-
ability of traversing through each arm of the delay line.
This ensures that Alice and Bob’s single-photon pulses
are transformed into linear superpositions of three or-
thogonal states, corresponding to the three paths of
their respective delay line interferometers, as described
in Eq. (1). Alice and Bob then encode their random
key bits {0, 1} by assigning a relative phase difference of
{0, pi} between two successive pulses, using their phase
modulators (PM). Finally, they send their encoded sig-
nal states to the measurement unit (Charles).
Charles’ measurement set-up comprises of a beamsplit-
ter and two single-photon detectors, labeled Dc and Dd
as indicated in Fig. 2. For every photon detected by his
setup, he announces as to which detector clicked (Dc or
Dd or both) and the corresponding time-instance (t1, t2
or t3) at which the click was observed. Based on this
information, which is made public by Charles, Alice and
Bob perform sifting and extract the sifted key. The sift-
ing and reconciliation step is explained in detail in the
following section.
A. Sifting and Reconciliation
We may use the form of the encoded 3-pulse state in
Eq. (1) to represent the input to the Charles’ measure-
ment module as,
FIG. 2: Schematic of differential phase encoded MDI-QKD.
|ψ(φa1 , φa2 , φb1 , φb2)〉in =
1√
3
(
|1(a)〉1 |0(a)〉2 |0(a)〉3 + eiφa1 |0(a)〉1 |1(a)〉2 |0(a)〉3 + eiφa2 |0(a)〉1 |0(a)〉2 |1(a)〉3
)
4⊗ 1√
3
(
|1(b)〉1 |0(b)〉2 |0(b)〉3 + eiφb1 |0(b)〉1 |1(b)〉2 |0(b)〉3 + eiφb2 |0(b)〉1 |0(b)〉2 |1(b)〉3
)
.(2)
As before, |1〉 and |0〉 indicate the presence or absence of
a photon in a particular path, and the subscripts 1, 2, 3
label the different possible paths of Alice and Bob’s delay-
lines respectively. Thus, |1(a)〉1 |0(a)〉2 |0(a)〉3 is the 3-
pulse state corresponding to the photon traversing path
1a in Alice’s set-up, |0(b)〉1 |1(b)〉2 |0(b)〉3 is a 3-pulse state
corresponding to photon traversing path 2b in Bob’s set-
up, and so on.
Corresponding to every pair of photons generated by
the sources, there are three distinct time-instances –
t1, t2, t3 – at which Charles’ detectors click, correspond-
ing to paths 1a, 2a, 3a and 1b, 2b, 3b in Alice and Bob’s
set-ups respectively. We first rewrite Charles’ input state
by grouping pairs of pulses that arrive at the same time-
instance:
|ψ〉in =
1
3
[ |1(a)1(b)〉t1 |0(a)0(b)〉t2 |0(a)0(b)〉t3 + eiφa1 |0(a)1(b)〉t1 |1(a)0(b)〉t2 |0(a)0(b)〉t3
+ eiφa2 |0(a)1(b)〉t1 |0(a)0(b)〉t2 |1(a)0(b)〉t3 + eiφb1 |1(a)0(b)〉t1 |0(a)1(b)〉t2 |0(a)0(b)〉t3 + eiφb2 |1(a)0(b)〉t1 |0(a)0(b)〉t2 |0(a)1(b)〉t3
+ei(φa1+φb1 ) |0(a)0(b)〉t1 |1(a)1(b)〉t2 |0(a)0(b)〉t3 + ei(φa1+φb2 ) |0(a)0(b)〉t1 |1(a)0(b)〉t2 |0(a)1(b)〉t3
+ei(φa2+φb1 ) |0(a)0(b)〉t1 |0(a)1(b)〉t2 |1(a)0(b)〉t3 + ei(φa2+φb2 ) |0(a)0(b)〉t1 |0(a)0(b)〉t2 |1(a)1(b)〉t3 ]. (3)
Note that the pairs of photons that traverse through
identical paths in Alice and Bob’s interferometer (such
as (1a, 1b) or (2a, 2b) or (3a, 3b)) do not contribute to the
sifted key. Such a pair of photons would bunch together
due to Hong-Ou-Mandel interference [46] and come out
of the same port of the beamsplitter. Further, recall that
the action of the beamsplitter with input ports a, b and
output ports c, d, when there’s a photon incident on only
one of the two ports is given by,
|1(a)〉 |0(b)〉 −→ 1√
2
(
|1(c)〉 |0(d)〉+ |0(c)〉 |1(d)〉
)
,
|0(a)〉 |1(b)〉 −→ 1√
2
(
|1(c)〉 |0(d)〉 − |0(c)〉 |1(d)〉
)
. (4)
Using this, we can write down the final two-photon
state after the action of Charles’ beamsplitter. We refer
to Appendix A for the details of the calculation. From
the form of the final state in Eq. (A5), we observe that
depending on the values of the relative phases ∆φ1 =
φa1 − φb1 and ∆φ2 = φa2 − φb2 , Charles may have the
same or different detectors click at two different time-
instances.
Finally, Alice and Bob perform key reconciliation once
Charles announces his measurement outcomes. Based on
which detector (Dc or Dc) clicks and the time-instances
(t1, t2 and t3) corresponding to the clicks for each pair of
signal states, Alice and Bob can generate the sifted key
using either ∆φ1 or ∆φ2 as described in Table I.
It follows immediately that the the sifted key rate of
our protocol is,
Rsift =
2
3
× 2
3
=
4
9
. (5)
Comparing Eqs. (3) and (A1), we see that one-third of
the incoming photons have to be discarded due to Hong-
Ou-Mandel interference. This leads to the first factor of
2
3 . Next, we observe from the key reconciliation table
that two-thirds of Charles’ measurements contribute to
the raw key, thus leading to a sifted key rate of 49 . We
note that the MDI protocol based on the 3-pulse encoding
offers a lower key rate compared to the one based on the
coherent-state pulse-train DPS encoding [27].
B. Asymptotic Secure Key Rate
Alice and Bob perform classical post-processing on the
sifted key to extract the final secure key from it. The
first step of this post-processing is the estimation of the
error rate in the sifted key, which involves Alice and Bob
exposing a fraction of their sifted key bits in order to
calculate the error rate. They abort the protocol and
start again from the beginning (i.e signal transmission
to Charles) if their calculated error rate exceeds a pre-
defined threshold. They define this threshold error rate
by taking into account the error introduced in the key,
both due to system imperfections as well as any potential
eavesdropping.
When the estimated error rate lies below the thresh-
old error rate, they carry out the second step of post-
processing - error correction. Alice and Bob apply a
suitable error correction scheme on their sifted key to
correct all the erroneous bits. These error estimation
and correction steps happen over a classical channel. We
assume that the Eve has complete control over this clas-
sical channel and hence, is privy to all the information
being transmitted over this public channel between Alice
5Table I : Key reconciliation scheme for the proposed protocol
Measurement outcome of Charles Action of Alice and Bob Requirement of bit flip
Det c clicks at both t1 and t2 Extract key using ∆φ1 No
Det c clicks at both t2 and t3 Discard the bits -
Det c clicks at both t1 and t3 Extract key using ∆φ2 No
Det d clicks at both t1 and t2 Extract key using ∆φ1 No
Det d clicks at both t2 and t3 Discard the bits -
Det d clicks at both t1 and t3 Extract key using ∆φ2 No
Det c clicks at t1 and det d at t2 Extract key using ∆φ1 Yes
Det c clicks at t2 and det d at t1 Extract key using ∆φ1 Yes
Det c clicks at t1 and det d at t3 Extract key using ∆φ2 Yes
Det c clicks at t3 and det d at t1 Extract key using ∆φ2 Yes
Det c clicks at t2 and det d at t3 Discard the bits -
Det c clicks at t3 and det d at t2 Discard the bits -
and Bob. Therefore, the final step of this classical post-
processing is privacy amplification, which aims to reduce
Eve’s knowledge about the key well below an acceptable
level. This is done by discarding a fraction of the error-
free key. Alice and Bob typically use a hash function to
carry out privacy amplification.
Using the sifted key rate obtained in Eq. (5) and follow-
ing the standard analysis in [4], we obtain the following
asymptotic secure key rate, for our MDI-DPS protocol.
R = Rpracsift (1− f(e)h(e)) . (6)
Here, Rpracsift is the practical sifted key generation rate (in
bits/s) and f(e) represents the inefficiency of the error
correction scheme employed by Alice and Bob. Rpracsift
depends upon the probability of clicking of Charle’s de-
tectors (pclick) and the repetition rate of the source (γ)
as,
Rpracsift = Rsiftγpclick. (7)
Charles detectors can click either due to the signal pho-
tons or due to the background noise. The detector
clicks due to background noise are referred as dark count.
Hence,
pclick = psignal + pdark. (8)
The probability of one of the detectors clicking due to
the signal photons is proportional to the transmission
efficiency of the channel. We assume that the channel
connecting Alice to Charles and the one connecting Bob
to Charles are identical in every aspect (length, charac-
teristic loss etc.), and hence define the total transmission
efficiency (T ) of the channel and Charles detection setup
as,
T = η10−αL/10. (9)
Here, η is the quantum efficiency of the single-photon
detector of the Charles. The error rate (e) is determined
only by the dark count and the baseline error rate (b) of
the system as shown below.
e =
1
2pdark + bpsignal
psignal + pdark
. (10)
A factor of half comes into Eq. (10) as half of the dark
counts lead to correct clicking of the detectors because of
the random nature of these clicks.
To get a numerical estimate of the asymptotic key rate,
we now evaluate R by taking the values of all the fixed pa-
rameters of the system from [45]. The detection efficiency
of the single-photon detector is 10%, the loss co-efficient
of channel is 0.2 dB/km and the baseline error rate is
taken as 1%. pdark is taken as 2× 10−5, γ is fixed at 10
MHz and f(e) assumes a value of 1.16. We can now plot
the variation in key rate with the length of the channel
between Alice and Bob, as shown in Fig. 3.
Our plot compares the secure key rate obtained for our
DPS-MDI-QKD with that obtained for 3-pulse DPS and
the BB84 protocols. We see that the DPS-MDI protocol
yields a non-zero secure key rate for much longer channel
lengths, in comparison with the standard 3-pulse DPS
protocol.
6FIG. 3: Secure key rate as a function of channel length
for the asymptotic case.
C. Practical implementation
As described above, Alice and Bob can share a se-
cure key using the setup in Fig. 2. However, a practi-
cal implementation of the proposed scheme requires cer-
tain modifications to the set-up (see Fig. 4). Firstly, key
generation requires detection of two time-synchronized
photons by a single detector. In practice, this would be
constrained by the finite dead-time of the single-photon
detectors. Hence, an acousto-optic deflector (AOD) is
used to route the photon in each time-instance to differ-
ent single-photon detectors. This results in a slight mod-
ification to the key-reconciliation step, namely, Charles
now announces which pair of detectors clicked in each
time-instance.
Another challenge in the practical implementation of
this scheme is the requirement of a common phase ref-
erence between Alice’s and Bob’s sources. This require-
ment arises because Alice and Bob use independent laser
sources for generating their single-photon pulses. The op-
tical phase-locked loop (OPLL) technique [47, 48], com-
monly used in coherent detections, can be used to phase
lock the sources used by Alice and Bob. The OPLL
has a simple setup and requires only off-the-shelf com-
ponents [49].
IV. FINITE KEY ANAYSIS OF DPS-MDI-QKD
In order to analyse our protocol in the finite-key
regime, we first map it to a protocol that involves shared
entangled pairs between Alice and Bob. Such a mapping
of a phase-encoded protocol to an entanglement-based
protocol has been shown earlier [35]. Following a sim-
ilar approach, we now show there exists an equivalent,
entanglement- based protocol to our proposed DPS-MDI-
QKD protocol.
A. An equivalent entanglement-based protocol
We first represent Alice’s single-photon pulse in a linear
superposition of three orthogonal states, as follows,
|ψ〉Alice =
1√
3
3∑
k=1
a†k |vac〉 . (11)
Here, a†k denotes the creation operator for the photon
in the kth time-instance. Alice uses a quantum random
number generator to generate a random 2-bit integer j,
written in binary notation as (j1j2)2. She encodes this
random integer in the single-photon pulse, such that the
encoded state is written as,
|ψj〉Alice =
1√
3
(
a†1|vac〉+
3∑
k=2
(−1)j
′
ka†k|vac〉
)
, (12)
where j
′
k =
∑k−1
l=1 jl. Alice prepares and stores 2 qubits
corresponding to each encoded block in her quantum
memory, which are entangled with the encoded block as
follows,
|ψ〉Alice =
1
2
3∑
j=0
(|j1〉A1 |j2〉A2)⊗ |ψj〉Alice . (13)
Bob also carries out a similar encoding procedure as Al-
ice to get his own register of qubits entangled with his
encoding blocks. Along the lines of Eqs. (12) and (13),
Bob’s state is written as,
|ψ˜〉Bob =
1
2
3∑
j=0
(|j˜1〉B1 |j˜2〉B2)⊗ |ψ˜j〉Bob , (14)
where j˜ is the random 2-bit integer used by Bob to encode
his single-photon pulse.
Alice and Bob send their encoded states across to
Charles. He first applies a quantum non-demolition
(QND) measurement to find the number of photons in
a given state and throws away the ones which have more
than one photon in the same time-instance. He sends
the rest through his beamsplitter. He then publicly an-
nounces the time instance (say k = 1, 2, 3), as well as the
detector (Dc or Dd), at which the photon was detected.
As explained in Table I in Sec. III, based upon Charles’s
measurement outcome, Alice and Bob use either ∆φ1 or
∆φ2 to extract the key.
When their shared key is established using ∆φi, Al-
ice and Bob retain their corresponding ancilla qubits
(Ai and Bi, respectively) and discard the other ancilla
qubit. As shown in Appendix B, for those time-instances
when they do not need to carry-out a bit flip opera-
tion, they share a perfectly correlated entangled state
1√
2
[|0〉Ai |0〉Bi − |1〉Ai |1〉Bi ]. On the other hand, corre-
sponding to those time-instances when they execute a
7bit-flip to extract the shared key, they share the anti-
correlated Bell state 1√
2
[|0〉Ai |1〉Bi − |1〉Ai |0〉Bi ]. A de-
tailed discussion of the joint state after Charles’ measure-
ment and key-reconciliation can be found in Appendix B.
FIG. 4: Practical implementation of DPS-MDI-QKD.
B. Finite key analysis
Finiteness of key size constitutes a major chink in the
security proofs of practical QKD protocols. Most of the
theoretical proofs provide a bound on the secure key rate
by assuming the key size as infinite. However, practical
implementations cannot run forever. This gap in theory
and practice is bridged by providing security bounds for
the finite number of signal exchanges between Alice and
Bob.
A perfect key is a uniformly distributed bit string, hav-
ing no dependence on adversary’s knowledge. Practical
keys deviate from this ideal scenario, and this deviation is
captured by a parameter ε, interpreted as the maximum
probability of a practical key differing from a completely
random bit string. Following [50, 51], we say that a key
K is ε-secure with respect to an eavesdropper E if,
1
2
‖ ρKE − τK ⊗ ρE ‖1≤ ε. (15)
Here, ρKE is the joint state of the ‘key system’ K and
the adversary E, and τK is the completely mixed state
on K.
In the asymptotic case, for any QKD protocol involv-
ing Alice and Bob sharing entangled pairs, under the
assumption of collective attacks, the secure key rate (R)
can be bounded as [1, 3, 52],
R = H(X | E)−H(X | Y ). (16)
Here X and Y represent Alice and Bob’s key systems re-
spectively, E represents the eavesdropper, and H(. | .)
is the conditional von Neumann entropy. Intuitively,
Eq. (16) follows from the fact that the secure key rate
is equal to Eve’s uncertainty about the raw key X mi-
nus Bob’s uncertainty. For our DPS-MDI protocol, the
conditional entropy H(X | E) can be expressed as [53],
H(X˜ | E˜) = 1− h(eb), (17)
where eb is the bit error rate.
We follow the finite-key analysis presented in [53,
54], involving a generalization of von Neumann en-
tropy, called the smooth entropy. The objective of this
smoothening of the regular entropic functions is to take
into account the fluctuations arising from the finite sig-
nal size. As in the asymptotic case, Alice and Bob are
assumed to share entangled pairs, which holds for our
proposed scheme, as outlined in Sec. IV A above. The
generalized form of Eq. (16) in the finite-key regime can
be expressed as [54],
r = Hξ(X | E)− (leakEC + ∆)/n, (18)
where Hξ(X | E) is the conditional smooth-min entropy,
leakEC is the number of bits needed to be shared over a
classical channel for error correction and ∆ is as shown
below,
∆ = 2 log2
1
[2(ε− ε¯− εEC)]
+ 7
√
n log2(2/(ε¯− ε¯′)). (19)
8FIG. 5: Key rate r as a function of the number of
exchanged quantum signals for different values of Q.
Here, εEC is the error probability, defined as the prob-
ability that Bob ends up with a wrong bit string after
the error correction stage. ε¯ and ε¯′ are the smoothening
parameters as mentioned in Lemma 2 of [54].
We calculate Hξ(X | E) for our protocol using the
asymptotic value of H(X | E). In the finite-key regime
Eq. (17) translates to,
Hξ(X | E) = 1− h(e˜b), (20)
where ξ is a non-negative parameter (Lemma 3 of [54]
given by,
ξ =
√
2 ln(1/ε¯′) + d ln(m+ 1)
m
. (21)
The bit error rate in finite-key regime is expressed as
e˜b = eb+ξ(m, d = 2), where m is the number of bits used
in parameter estimation and d is the number of possible
POVM outcomes. Using Eqs. (19), (20), and (21) we
may estimate the sifted key rate as described in Eq. (18).
The performance of a practical error correcting code as
analyzed in [54] gives leakEC/n = 1.2h(Q), where, Q is
the quantum bit error rate (QBER). This helps in esti-
mating the second term of Eq. (18). (N, ε, leakEC , εEC)
are protocol dependent parameters, whereas n,m, ε¯ and
ε¯′ are selected so as to maximize the key rate per signal
(r = (n/N)r′) under the constraints n + m ≤ N and
ε− εEC > ε¯ > ε¯′ ≥ 0.
Fig. 5 shows the variation of key rate with the number
of exchanged signals for the proposed protocol. We have
used ε = 10−5, εEC = 10−10 for generating the plots for
different values of Q. The key rate per signal (r) tends
to the sifted key rate of 49 in the asymptotic limit, as
expected. This is a reflection of the fact that only 49 of
the raw key bits can be used for key generation and rest
is used for parameter estimation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a 3-path superpo-
sition based DPS-MDI-QKD protocol. We have shown
the necessity and advantages of having the 3-path su-
perposition. The proposed protocol is mapped to an
entanglement-based protocol. This allows us to carry
out the finite-key analysis of the protocol. We further
simulated the variation in key rate with the number of
exchanged signals of our protocol. One interesting ques-
tion that arose during this work was regarding finite-key
analysis of 3-path DPS-MDI using weak coherent source.
Another interesting problem that can be addressed in
the future works is tightening of the bounds used in the
finite-key analysis of the proposed protocol.
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Appendix A: Analysis of DPS-MDI-QKD protocol
FIG. 6: a and b are the input ports of the beamsplitter. The output ports are c and d.
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We start with the form of the input to Charles’ beamsplitter given in Eq. (3):
|ψ〉in =
1
3
[ |1(a)1(b)〉t1 |0(a)0(b)〉t2 |0(a)0(b)〉t3 + eiφa1 |0(a)1(b)〉t1 |1(a)0(b)〉t2 |0(a)0(b)〉t3
+ eiφa2 |0(a)1(b)〉t1 |0(a)0(b)〉t2 |1(a)0(b)〉t3 + eiφb1 |1(a)0(b)〉t1 |0(a)1(b)〉t2 |0(a)0(b)〉t3 + eiφb2 |1(a)0(b)〉t1 |0(a)0(b)〉t2 |0(a)1(b)〉t3
+ei(φa1+φb1 ) |0(a)0(b)〉t1 |1(a)1(b)〉t2 |0(a)0(b)〉t3 + ei(φa1+φb2 ) |0(a)0(b)〉t1 |1(a)0(b)〉t2 |0(a)1(b)〉t3
+ei(φa2+φb1 ) |0(a)0(b)〉t1 |0(a)1(b)〉t2 |1(a)0(b)〉t3 + ei(φa2+φb2 ) |0(a)0(b)〉t1 |0(a)0(b)〉t2 |1(a)1(b)〉t3 ].
We leave out the states that correspond to photons traversing identical paths in Alice and Bob’s set-ups, since they
do not contribute to the sifted key, and consider the (normalized) state,
|ψ˜〉in =
1√
6
[ eiφa1 |0(a)1(b)〉t1 |1(a)0(b)〉t2 |0(a)0(b)〉t3 + eiφa2 |0(a)1(b)〉t1 |0(a)0(b)〉t2 |1(a)0(b)〉t3
+ eiφb1 |1(a)0(b)〉t1 |0(a)1(b)〉t2 |0(a)0(b)〉t3 + eiφb2 |1(a)0(b)〉t1 |0(a)0(b)〉t2 |0(a)1(b)〉t3
+ ei(φa1+φb2 ) |0(a)0(b)〉t1 |1(a)0(b)〉t2 |0(a)1(b)〉t3 + ei(φa2+φb1 ) |0(a)0(b)〉t1 |0(a)1(b)〉t2 |1(a)0(b)〉t3 ]. (A1)
Setting φa1 − φb1 = ∆φ1 and φa1 − φb1 = ∆φ1 to be the phase differences between corresponding pulses from Alice
and Bob, the input to Charles’ beamsplitter can be written as,
|ψ˜〉in =
1√
6
ei(φb1+φb2 )[ ei∆φ1 |0(a)0(b)〉t1 |1(a)0(b)〉t2 |0(a)1(b)〉t3 + ei∆φ2 |0(a)0(b)〉t1 |0(a)1(b)〉t2 |1(a)0(b)〉t3
+e−iφb1
(
|1(a)0(b)〉 |0(a)0(b)〉 |0(a)1(b)〉+ ei∆φ2 |0(a)1(b)〉t1 |0(a)0(b)〉t2 |1(a)0(b)〉t3
)
+e−iφb2
(
|1(a)0(b)〉t1 |0(a)1(b)〉t2 |0(a)0(b)〉t3 + ei∆φ1 |0(a)1(b)〉t1 |1(a)0(b)〉t2 |0(a)0(b)〉t3
)
]. (A2)
Fig. 6 shows a typical 50 : 50 beamsplitter. The beamsplitter acts on the input states as shown below,
|1〉a |0〉b −→
1√
2
(|1〉c |0〉d + |0〉c |1〉d),
|0〉a |1〉b −→
1√
2
(|1〉c |0〉d − |0〉c |1〉d). (A3)
Here, c and d are the output modes and a and b are the input modes. Applying the beamsplitter transformation
to Eq. (A2), we get
|ψ〉out =
1
2
√
6
ei(φb1+φb2 )
[
ei∆φ1 |0(c)0(d)〉t1
(
|1(c)0(d)〉t2 + |0(c)1(d)〉t2
)(
|1(c)0(d)〉t3 − |0(c)1(d)〉t3
)
+ei∆φ2 |0(c)0(d)〉t1
(
|1(c)0(d)〉t2 − |0(c)1(d)〉t2
)(
|1(c)0(d)〉t3 + |0(c)1(d)〉t3
)
+e−iφb1
{(
|1(c)0(d)〉t1 + |0(c)1(d)〉t1
)
|0(c)0(d)〉t2
(
|1(c)0(d)〉t3 − |0(c)1(d)〉t3
)
+ei∆φ2
(
|1(c)0(d)〉t1 − |0(c)1(d)〉t1
)
|0(c)0(d)〉t2
(
|1(c)0(d)〉t3 + |0(c)1(d)〉t3
)}
+e−iφb2
{(
|1(c)0(d)〉t1 + |0(c)1(d)〉t1
)(
|1(c)0(d)〉t2 − |0(c)1(d)〉t2
)
|0(c)0(d)〉t3
+ei∆φ1
(
|1(c)0(d)〉t1 − |0(c)1(d)〉t1
)(
|1(c)0(d)〉t2 + |0(c)1(d)〉t2
)
|0(c)0(d)〉t3
}]
.
(A4)
The output can be further simplified as,
|ψ〉out =
1
2
√
6
ei(φb1+φb2 )
[
ei∆φ1
(
|0(c)0(d)〉t1 |1(c)0(d)〉t2 |1(c)0(d)〉t3 − |0(c)0(d)〉t1 |1(c)0(d)〉t2 |0(c)1(d)〉t3
+ |0(c)0(d)〉t1 |0(c)1(d)〉t2 |1(c)0(d)〉t3 − |0(c)0(d)〉t1 |0(c)1(d)〉t2 |0(c)1(d)〉t3
)
+ ei∆φ2
(
|0(c)0(d)〉t1 |1(c)0(d)〉t2 |1(c)0(d)〉t3
+ |0(c)0(d)〉t1 |1(c)0(d)〉t2 |0(c)1(d)〉t3 − |0(c)0(d)〉t1 |0(c)1(d)〉t2 |1(c)0(d)〉t3 − |0(c)0(d)〉t1 |0(c)1(d)〉t2 |0(c)1(d)〉t3
)
+e−iφb1
{(
|1(c)0(d)〉t1 |0(c)0(d)〉t2 |1(c)0(d)〉t3 − |1(c)0(d)〉t1 |0(c)0(d)〉t2 |0(c)1(d)〉t3 + |0(c)1(d)〉t1 |0(c)0(d)〉t2 |1(c)0(d)〉t3
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− |0(c)1(d)〉t1 |0(c)0(d)〉t2 |0(c)1(d)〉t3
)
+ ei∆φ2
(
|1(c)0(d)〉t1 |0(c)0(d)〉t2 |1(c)0(d)〉t3 + |1(c)0(d)〉t1 |0(c)0(d)〉t2 |0(c)1(d)〉t3
− |0(c)1(d)〉t1 |0(c)0(d)〉t2 |1(c)0(d)〉t3 − |0(c)1(d)〉t1 |0(c)0(d)〉t2 |0(c)1(d)〉t3
)}
+e−iφb2
{(
|1(c)0(d)〉t1 |1(c)0(d)〉t2 |0(c)0(d)〉t3 − |1(c)0(d)〉t1 |0(c)1(d)〉t2 |0(c)0(d)〉t3 + |0(c)1(d)〉t1 |1(c)0(d)〉t2 |0(c)0(d)〉t3
− |0(c)1(d)〉t1 |0(c)1(d)〉t2 |0(c)0(d)〉t3
)
+ ei∆φ1
(
|1(c)0(d)〉t1 |1(c)0(d)〉t2 |0(c)0(d)〉t3 + |1(c)0(d)〉t1 |0(c)1(d)〉t2 |0(c)0(d)〉t3
− |0(c)1(d)〉t1 |1(c)0(d)〉t2 |0(c)0(d)〉t3 − |0(c)1(d)〉t1 |0(c)1(d)〉t2 |0(c)0(d)〉t3
)}]
(A5)
The output after the beamsplitter depends upon the random phase applied by Alice and Bob to their respective
time-bins. We write down the four different final states realized, corresponding to the four possible values of
(∆φ1,∆φ2). In order to help understand the key-reconciliation step, we have rewritten the final state by grouping
together the states at each output port (c or d), corresponding to the three different time-instances (t1, t2 or t3).
Case 1: When both ∆φ1 = 0 and ∆φ2 = 0, using Eq. (A5), the two-photon state after the beamsplitter is,
|ψ〉out =
1√
6
ei(φb1+φb2 )
[(
|0(t1)1(t2)1(t3)〉c |0(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉d − |0(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉c |0(t1)1(t2)1(t3)〉d
)
+e−iφb1
(
|1(t1)0(t2)1(t3)〉c |0(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉d − |0(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉c |1(t1)0(t2)1(t3)〉d
)
+e−iφb2
(
|1(t1)1(t2)0(t3)〉c |0(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉d − |0(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉c |1(t1)1(t2)0(t3)〉d
)]
. (A6)
Case 2: When both ∆φ1 = pi and ∆φ2 = pi, the output state of the beamsplitter is,
|ψ〉out =
1√
6
ei(φb1+φb2 )
[(
|0(t1)1(t2)1(t3)〉c |0(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉d − |0(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉c |0(t1)1(t2)1(t3)〉d
)
+e−iφb1
(
|0(t1)0(t2)1(t3)〉c |1(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉d − |1(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉c |0(t1)0(t2)1(t3)〉d
)
+e−iφb2
(
|0(t1)1(t2)0(t3)〉c |1(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉d − |1(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉c |0(t1)1(t2)0(t3)〉d
)]
. (A7)
Case 3: When ∆φ1 = 0 and ∆φ2 = pi, the output state is,
|ψ〉out =
1√
6
ei(φb1+φb2 )
[(
|0(t1)0(t2)1(t3)〉c |0(t1)1(t2)0(t3)〉d − |0(t1)1(t2)0(t3)〉c |0(t1)0(t2)1(t3)〉d
)
+e−iφb1
(
|0(t1)0(t2)1(t3)〉c |1(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉d − |1(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉c |0(t1)0(t2)1(t3)〉d
)
+e−iφb2
(
|1(t1)1(t2)0(t3)〉c |0(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉d − |0(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉c |1(t1)1(t2)0(t3)〉d
)]
. (A8)
Case 4: When ∆φ1 = pi and ∆φ2 = 0, the output state is,
|ψ〉out =
1√
6
ei(φb1+φb2 )
[(
|0(t1)1(t2)0(t3)〉c |0(t1)0(t2)1(t3)〉d − |0(t1)0(t2)1(t3)〉c |0(t1)1(t2)0(t3)〉d
)
+e−iφb1
(
|1(t1)0(t2)1(t3)〉c |0(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉d − |0(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉c |1(t1)0(t2)1(t3)〉d
)
+e−iφb2
(
|0(t1)1(t2)0(t3)〉c |1(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉d − |1(t1)0(t2)0(t3)〉c |0(t1)1(t2)0(t3)〉d
)]
. (A9)
We now formulate the key reconciliation scheme (see Table I) based on Eqs. (A6)- (A9), and noting that detector
Dc detects the photons from port c of the beamsplitter and correspondingly detector Dd clicks when photons exits
from port d.
For example, when Charles announces the clicking of Dc at both t1 and t2 time-bins, this would indicate that ∆φ1
and ∆φ2 have taken values corresponding to Case 1 (Eq. (A6)) or Case 3 (Eq. (A8))above. These are the only cases
with terms denoting the clicking of the detector c at both t1 and t2 time-bins. ∆φ1 = 0 in both the cases whereas
∆φ2 can be 0 or pi. Alice and Bob therefore use ∆φ1 to extract the key, when the detector Dc clicks at the time-bins
t1 and t2.
Similarly, clicking of the detector Dc at t1 and the detector Dd at t2 leads to Alice and Bob using ∆φ1 for extracting
the key. They also need to use a bit flip operation to get the same key bits. This is because only Eq. (A7) and Eq. (A9)
have terms that correspond to the clicking of the detector Dc at t1 and the detector Dd at t2. ∆φ2 is random whereas
∆φ1 = pi in both the equations. Hence, they apply a bit flip operation to ∆φ1 to extract the same key bits. Similar
reasoning can be used to complete the key reconciliation scheme as described in Table 1.
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Appendix B: DPS-MDI as an entanglement-based protocol
We start with Eqs. (13) and (14), to write the joint state of Alice and Bob after their encoding procedure. Recall
that A and B indicate Alice and Bob’s signal states, whereas Ai and Bi indicate the i
th qubit in their respective
(ideal) quantum memories. The joint state thus reads as,
|ψ〉Alice ⊗ |ψ〉Bob =
1
4
∑
j1,j2∈{0,1}
(|j1〉A1 |j2〉A2)⊗ |ψj〉A ⊗
∑
j˜1,j˜2∈{0,1}
(|j˜1〉B1 |j˜2〉B2)⊗ |ψj〉B
=
1
4
∑
j1,j2,j˜1,j˜2∈{0,1}
|j1〉A1 |j˜1〉B1 |j2〉A2 |j˜2〉B2
⊗
|Ψ(j1j2 j˜1 j˜2)〉AB . (B1)
The state |Ψ(j1j2 j˜1 j˜2)〉AB , which eventually becomes the input to Charles’ beamsplitter, has the following form:
|Ψ(j1j2 j˜1 j˜2)〉
AB
=
(
a†1b
†
1 +
2∑
i=1
(−1)(ji+j˜i)a†i+1b†i+1 + (−1)j˜1a†1b†2 + (−1)(j˜1+j˜2)a†1b†3
+ (−1)j1a†2b†1 + (−1)(j1+j˜1+j˜2)a†2b†3 + (−1)(j1+j2)a†3b†1 + (−1)(j1+j2+j˜1)a†3b†2
)
|0(a)0(b)〉
AB
. (B2)
Here, a†i and b
†
i are the creation operators corresponding to a photon traversing through the i
th arm in Alice and
Bob’s delay lines respectively, and |0(a)0(b)〉AB denotes the vacuum. As indicated above, there is no entanglement yet
between Alice and Bob’s states; rather, each encoded state is entangled with their respective quantum memories.
To obtain the output state after measurement and key reconciliation, we first do post-selection and discard input
states which have photons arriving at the same time-instance from both Alice and Bob. As mentioned earlier, such
photons do not contribute to the final key, due to Hong-Ou-Mandel interference. We thus drop terms of the form a†i b
†
i
in Eq. (B2). When the photons arrive at different times, as represented by terms of the form a†i b
†
j , they transform as,
a† → 1√
2
(c† + d†) ; b† → 1√
2
(c† − d†).
We may thus write down the final state after the action of the beamsplitter and post-selection as,
|Φ(j1j2 j˜1 j˜2)〉
CD
=
1
2
[
(−1)j˜1(c†1 + d†1)(c†2 − d†2) + (−1)(j˜1+j˜2)(c†1 + d†1)(c†3 − d†3) + (−1)j1(c†2 + d†2)(c†1 − d†1)
+(−1)(j1+j˜1+j˜2)(c†2 + d†2)(c†3 − d†3) + (−1)(j1+j2)(c†3 + d†3)(c†1 − d†1)
+(−1)(j1+j2+j˜1)(c†3 + d†3)(c†2 − d†2)
]
|0(c)0(d)〉CD. (B3)
The complete state, including the registers A1, A2 and B1, B2, is of the form,
|χ〉A1B2A2B2CD =
1
4
∑
j1,j2,j˜1,j˜2∈{0,1}
|j1〉A1 |j˜1〉B1 |j2〉A2 |j˜2〉B2
⊗
|Φ(j1j2 j˜1 j˜2)〉CD. (B4)
As discussed in section IV A , Alice and Bob extract information about their relative phases ∆φ1 = φa1 − φb1
and ∆φ2 = φa2 − φb2 based on Charles’ measurement outcomes, and hence obtain the shared key. Expressing all
the phases in terms of the binary variables (j1, j2) and (j˜1, j˜2), which characterize Alice and Bob’s qubit registers
respectively, we have,
φa1 = j1pi, φa2 = (j2 + j1)pi, φb1 = j˜1pi, φb2 = (j˜2 + j˜1)pi.
Thus the relative phases are given by,
∆φ1 = (j1 − j˜1)pi, ∆φ2 = (j2 + j1 − j˜2 − j˜1)pi.
It is now easy to show that the joint state of Alice and Bob’s registers collapses to an entangled state after Charles’
measurement and the reconciliation process described in Table 1. In particular, when Alice and Bob use the phases
φai , φbi to generate their secret key bits without a bit flip operation, they end up with the perfectly correlated Bell
state 1√
2
[|0〉Ai |0〉Bi − |1〉Ai |1〉Bi ]. In those cases where they need to perform a bit flip operation, they end up sharing
the anti-correlated entangled state 1√
2
[|0〉Ai |1〉Bi − |1〉Ai |0〉Bi ].
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For example, when Charles announces that the detector c has clicked in both t1 and t2 bins, Eq. (B4) collapses to
the post-measurement state,
|χ(1)〉out = 1
2
√
6
[
|0A10B10A20B2〉+ |0A10B10A21B2〉+ |0A10B11A20B2〉+ |0A10B11A21B2〉
− |1A11B10A20B2〉 − |1A11B10A21B2〉 − |1A11B11A20B2〉 − |1A11B11A21B2〉
]
⊗[
|1(c)0(d)〉t1 + |1(c)0(d)〉t2 + |0(c)0(d)〉t3
]
(B5)
We see that in Eq. (B5), the first ancilla registers (A1 and B1) of both Alice and Bob always have same bit value.
Hence, Alice and Bob share the perfectly correlated Bell state, as shown explicitly below,
|χ(1)〉out =
1
2
√
2
[
|0〉A1 |0〉B1 − |1〉A1 |1〉B1
]⊗[
|0〉A2 |0〉B2 + |0〉A2 |1〉B2 + |1〉A2 |0〉B2 + |1〉A2 |1〉B2
]
⊗ 1√
3
(
|1(c)0(d)〉t1 + |1(c)0(d)〉t2 + |0(c)0(d)〉t3
)
(B6)
When Charles announces that the detector c clicked at t1 and d at t2, the state presented in Eq. (B4) collapses to,
|χ(2)〉out =
1
2
√
6
[
|0A11B10A20B2〉+ |0A11B10A21B2〉+ |0A11B11A20B2〉+ |0A11B11A21B2〉
− |1A10B10A20B2〉 − |1A10B10A21B2〉 − |1A10B11A20B2〉 − |1A10B11A21B2〉
]
⊗[
|1(c)0(d)〉t1 + |0(c)1(d)〉t2 + |0(c)0(d)〉t3
]
. (B7)
As seen from Eq. (B7), the first ancilla registers (A1 and B1) of Alice and Bob are now always opposite in the bit
value. This implies they share an anti-correlated entangled state. Hence, they require a bit flip operation after Charles
announcement so as to ensure that both of them end up with similar key bits. We can extend similar lines of reasoning
to the other entries of Table 1 to show that Alice and Bob indeed share maximally entangled states.
